PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED

BY

DEcIsiONS SELECTED

FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.

ATTORNEYS.

In re Cahill, 5o Atl. 119, the Supreme Court of New

Jersey summarizes the grounds upon which an attorney may
Grounds
be disbarred as follows: To justify the disbarof DIsbament ment of an attorney, one of three things should
be established: (i) conviction of crime, (2) evidence which,
in the judgment of the court, shows that he has committed
a crime and that the facts proven would justify a conviction
thereof, (3) such intentional fraud upon the court or a client
as shows evidence of mortal turpitude. For less offences,
such temporary suspension, as the court might deem proper
should be imposedBANKRUPTCY.

A testator devised certain real estate situate in Pennsylvania to the mother of the bankrupt "for and during the
term of her natural life and at the time of her
Eatse,
decease to her surviving children equally share
and share alike

.

.

.

to hold to them their

heirs and assigns, forever." After the death of the testator
and during the lifetime of the life beneficiary, one of her
children was adjudged a bankrupt. Under these facts the
Urited States District Court (District of Delaware) holds
it re Twaddell, iIO Fed. 145, that .he had a vested interest
in the subject of the devise, which passed to his assignee in
bankruptcy.
CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Marshalltown Stone
Co. v. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co., 87 N. W. 496, that an
Public Policy,

Restraint

of

Competition

agreement bttween a party about to enter into

a contract to furnish certain paving materials
to a city for use on a certain street, and another,
whereby the latter is to pay the former a certain

amount per cubic yard for the material used in such street,

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
CONTRACTS (Continued.)

on condition that the former will not enter int6 such contract nor sell any such material in that city, is not void as
against public policy, because tending to prevent competition, because it is limited as to time, place, and commodity.
The court relies on Hedge v. Lowe, 47 Iowa, 137. Nothing
is said in the opinion as to the validity of the contract, in
view of the fact that its immediate effect is to compel the
municipality to pay an exorbitant price for material furnished. - This might well constitute a ground of attack, but
the court treats the question as though the furnishing the
material had reference to a private individual.
A concise definition of a moral obligation which is a
sufficient consideration to support a promise and render valid
noral
a contract founded thereon is given by the SuObligation
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Davis v.
Anderson, 39 S. E. 588, where it is held that, for a moral
obligation to be sufficient to sustain a promise or conveyance,
it must be one Which has been once a valuable consideration,
but has ceased to be binding for some supervenient cause;
as, for example, the statute of limitations, or the intervention of bankruptcy.
Where one repudiates a contract by which he is bound to
make certain payments at certain times, the other party is
not bound to sue for damages as for a breach, or
Repudiation, to wait till all the installments are due, but may
Action for
Installments bring separate actions for the installments as
they become due: United States" Circuit Court
(S. D. Ohio, W. D.) in Pennring v. Carter-CunneCo., iio
Fed. 107.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in Bowers v.
J. B. Worth Co., 39 S. E. 635, that where, in accordance
with a contract, a vendor delivers a number of
Delivery of
Goods,

Recovery

bags of peanuts to a carrier under the contract
for shipment on the day fixed, the fact that two

days later he placed a number of other bags in
the car with the station agent's consent, and the bill of lading
was changed so as to include the latter bags, such transaction
in no way delaying shipment, will not prevent recovery for
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the original number of bags, since such transaction did not
work any damage to the buyer.
An action to recover damages for a breach of contract to
purchase securities cannot be maintained by one who, after
making such contract to sell, has received payDamages for ment thereof from the maker of such securities,
and has canceled the securities: Supreme Court
Breach of
of Nebraska, in Kay v. McAuley, 87, N. W. 335.
Contract
The ground of the decision is that, though the
defendant's breach is complete, the plaintiff has put it absolutely beyond his power to complete the transaction.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The recent Act of March 21, 19Ol, in New Jersey, pro-

vided that the governor should have power, in his discretion,
on the application of one hundred voters, to
Delegation
.1
appoint a commission to district or redistrict
Legislative
wards in the cities of this state. In State v. City
Powers

of Elizabeth, 49 Atl. I io6, the Supreme Court

of New Jersey holds the act unconstitutional and void, not
only on the ground that it was local and special and authorized the regulation of municipal affairs by a commission, but
principally because it is decided to be an unlawful delegation
of legislative power. The court cites with approval the distinction laid down in Moers v. City of Reading. 21 Pa., 202,
that, "The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a
law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or
intends to make its own action depend."
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Com. v.
Mobile & 0. R. Co., 64 S. W. 451, that a state statute requirInterstate
ing a foreign railroad corporation to become a
Comerce
resident corporation, as a condition of its right
to continue to operate that part of its road within the state,
is not an in:erference With interstate commerce. within the
inhibition ,,f the federal constitution on the subject. Nor
doec such a -tatute deny to the foreign corporation the equ.-J
protection, : the laws of the state. Guffy.J.. di ei i witlhout assigni" any reasons.
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In New York the Statute (Laws 1848, c. 319) imposes
on directors a liability for corporate debts. The. Court of
Appeals of New York holds in Marsh v. Kaye,
Personal
Labilityof
6i N. E. 177, that under this provision an action
Directors
in equity cannot be maintained to enforce the
personal liability of the directors, such liability being absolute and unlimited, and not constituting a fund for the benefit
of creditors, since in the view of the court there is an adequate remedy at law. But, it is said, if such liability were
limited in amount, and the fund constituted thereby were
insufficient to satisfy the corporation's debts, the rule would
be otherwise. The court holds the liability of the directors
under the statute the same in kind with that of stockholders
and that it differed only in degree. It was argued that to
allow a suit in equity by one creditor on behalf of all would
avoid a multiplicity of suits, but the court refuses to sustain
this contention: Dykman v. Keeney, 154 N. Y. 483, 48 N. E.
894. Two judges dissent, arguing on the admitted theory
that the liability of the director is the same with that of -the
stockholder except in degree and claiming that the equitable
action would be sustained against these defendants were
they stockholders. See United States Trust Co. of New
York v. United States Fire Ins. Co., i8 N. Y. 199, 210.
DEFECTIVE BUILDING.

A tenant takes the premises subject to the risk of being
dispossessed through the condemnation of the leased buildDlspossessloi

ing as unsafe and dangerous, without recourse to

the landlord for damages resulting from such
removal: New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second Department) in Steefel v. Rothschild,
72 N. Y. Supp. 171.
of

Tenant

ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANIES.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds in Point
PleasantElectric Co. v. Borough of Bay Head, 49 Atl. Iio8,
use of
that until the borough council passes an ordiHighways
nance regulating the use of the borough streets,
or prescribing the manner in which electric light companies
shall exercise their street privileges, an electric light company which has obtained the consent of the owners of the
soil may string its wires in the public streets of the borough.
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EMINENT DOMAIN.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia holds in Virginia-CarolinaRailway Co. v. Broker, 39 S. E. 591, that
where, pending the hearing of exceptions to the
Persons
Entitled to
commissioners' allowance of compensation in
Cempensation condemnation proceedings by a railroad, the
land was conveyed, the owners of the land at the time
the commissioners' report was confirmed are entitled to compensation, and not the owner at the time when the proceedings were commenced.
EQUITY.

The Supreme Court of Washington holds in Lindsley v.
Union Silver Star Mining Co., 66 Pac. 382, that the fact
Juridiction, that the necessary parties are before a court of
Territorial
equity does not give it jurisdiction in proceedLimits

ings to enjoin trespass and waste in a mine

located in a foreign jurisdiction, where there is no further
ground for equitable interference. "In the examination of
the authorities," says the court, "we observe no instance of
such suit being maintained unless the controversy between
the parties involves primarily equitable jurisdiction. It is
apparent that the complaint involves in its essence the possession of the mining lode. The possession here is not incidental to the enforcement of a contract or trust or relief
from fraud, but is in itself the foundation of the controversy." Compare the cases of Jennings Bros. & Co. v. Beale,
(Pa.) 27 Atl. 948, and NorthernL R. Co. v. Michigan Cent.
R. Co., 15 How. 233.
GIIT.

In King v. Smith, iIo Fed. 95, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) holds that it is immaterial
that delivery to a donee is made while the donor
Dellvory
is unconscious; he having, while capable of
transacting business directed the delivery to be made.
HOMICIDE.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine holds in State v.
Oakes, 5o,Atl. 28, that in the trial of a person upon an indictment charging him with murder, an instruction
to the jury by the presiding justice, that their
Degree of
Crime, Jury

verdict should be not guilty, or guilty of murder

in the first degree, is repugnant to a statute,
which provides that "the jury, finding a person guilty of
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murder, shall find whether he is guilty of murder in the first
or second degree," and is therefore erroneous.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

It is well known that the settled rule in cases of malicious
prosecution is that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish
a termination of the prosecution in his favor, that
Malce.
it was prosecuted with malice andwithout reasonable and probable cause. In Lauterbachv. Netzo, 87 N. W.
23o, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that the malice
may be inferred from the want of probable cause.
MISREPRESENTATION.

How far the purchaser may rely on the representations of
the vendor, and to what extent it is his duty to examine for
himself when he is purchasing real estate, furnish
RescUslon
of
perplexing inquiries in the law on the rescission
of contracts. In Trammell v. Ashworth, 39 S. E.
Contract
593, a vendee of a house and lot sued to set aside the sale
thereof, on the ground that the vendor had informed her
prior to the sale, that her boundary line would fall at a certain place, and that the vendor informed her that a chimney
in the hall of the house was more than two feet distant from
a partition wall, so that the partition might easily be moved
two feet and the hall be enlarged. Both of these representations were false. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia holds that they were of such a character that their
truth or 'falsity was apparent, and refuses rescission of the
contract, notwithstanding that complainant averred her reliance upon the representations, and that without them she
would not have entered into the contract. The court does
not in its opinion decline to believe that the representations were relied on, but the spirit of the opinion makes that
seem a probable ground for the decision.
MORTGAGE.

In Wills v. Field, 49 Atl. 1128, the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey holds that where a distinct parcel of the mortgaged premises has been held for over twenty
Lien,
Dmcharge
years by grantees of the mortgagor, without covenant to pay the interest or principal of the mortgage, or
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actual payment of either, or other recognition of the incumbrance of the mortgage on such distinct parcel, and without
entry by the holder of the mortgage, the mortgage has ceased
to be a lien on such distinct parcel of the mortgaged premises, notwithstanding it was duly and seasonably recorded,
and interest has been continuously paid by other holders of
other distinct parcels of the mortgaged premises.
A mother died, leaving a husband and five surviving children. The husband and a son forged a deed purporting to
convey her real estate to the husband, and the latValidity,
Estoppel
ter then conveyed the property to the son, and it
was conveyed by the latter to a son who was not a party to
the forgery, though he had knowledge thereof, and the latter gave a mortgage in return therefor, which was assigned
to A. Under these facts the Supreme Court of Michigan
holds in Cliiw v. Wixson, 87 N. W. 207, that the mortgage
was a valid lien on a two-fifths interest in the property, as
the deed from the brother operated to pass his interest in the
land as heir.
NUISANCB.

In State v. Stark, 66 Pac. 243, the Supreme Court of Kansas holds that all places Where intoxicating liquors are sold
or kept for sale, or places where persons are
Aatet
permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking

the same, are nuisances under the statute law of the state.
This fact, however, says the court, does not justify their
abatement by any person or persons without due process of
law. They can be abated only by a prosecution instituted
in behalf of the public by the proper officer. The destruction
or injury to property used in aid of the maintenance of such
-nuisances, except in the matter provided by the statute, is a
trespass. This case grew out of the attempts of certain persons to take into their own hands the punishment for the violation of the Kansas liquor laws. The principles of law are
clear and well settled, and one is only surprised that action
was not more promptly adopted to suppress the lawless measures of ignorant fanaticism. "It was a congregation of law
breakers on one side retaliating upon an individual law
breaker on the other for lawless acts of the latter, which
affected not them alone, but hundreds of others (the public),
whom they assumed to represent."
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Where partition proceedings wore void for failure to join
.one of the interested parties, though his interest was recognized and apportioned, if all the parties acknowlValidity
when by
edged the proceedings, and exercised ownership
Parol
over their respective tracts, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that the partition, though not valid
as an oral partition, as contrary to the statute of frauds, nor
followed by twenty years' possession, was binding between
the parties, 'and they might be estopped from denying its
validity: Wescoat v. Wilson, 49 Atl. 1112.
PUBLIC OFICMES.

Thd Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia holds in
State v. Chilton, 39 S. E. 612, that while acts of a private
Unauthorized agent may bind the principal where they are
Acts
within the apparent scope of his authority, yet
it is not so in the case of the acts of public officers, In this
case the state is bound only by such authority as is actually
vested in the officer, and his powers are limited and defined
by its laws. Their unauthorized acts, therefore, though
within the apparent scope of their duty, do not bind the state
nor act as an estoppel against it.
RAILROADS.

In Sands v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S. W. 478, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee holds that where a party, knowing that
he is not entitled to ride on a freight train, pays
Riding
an
a brakeman for the privilege, and follows the
Freight
brakeman's directions so as, to evade the conTrains
ductor, he becomes a tresspasser,-and the company is not liable for injuries received in alighting from the
train. Nor in an action by a boy against a railroad company
for injuries received while riding on a train contrary to the
road's regulations, is proof of a custom as to allowing boys
to ride between stations admissible.
.In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Breeden's Adm"x, 64 S. W.
667, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that a railroad corporation leasing its road without direct
Libilit o
L-aor for legislative authority, is responsible for the torts
Negligence of of its lessee, though it surrenders complete conLessee
trol of the leased road. The principle upon

--A- *thus

stated4 .;-ir

..
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Osborne, 97 Ky. 112, 30 S. V. 21: "Public policy and the
law alike forbid that a railway company shall be allowed to
place its road, train, hands, and cars in the hands of or
under the control of a stranger for such purpose as is claimed
in this action, and thus evade liability for the wrongs done
by such person." The case of Louisville v. N. R. Co. v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. (Ky.), 53 S. W. 277, was relied
on by the appellee, the lessor, it having been held in that case
that an employee of the lessor engaged in the maintenance
of the road having been injured, and the lessor having paid
the loss, the lessee was liable to the lessor therefor. But the
court in this case distinguishes that decision on the ground
that all that was determined in that case was that the loss
was part of the expense incidental to the maintenance of the
road.
SEDUCTION.

The Kentucky statute, similar in this respect to statutes
of various other states, provides that in case the offence
of seduction is committed under promise of
subunt marriage, no prosecution shall be instituted when
of
the person charged shall have married the girl
Prosecuting seduced. In Commonwealth v. Hodgkins, 64
Witns
S. W. 414, the presecutrix was shown to have
had intercourse with another subsequent to the seduction,
and the defendant claimed that this relieved him from the
necessity of offering to marry the prosecutrix, on the same
principle that it would furnish a defence to a suit for breach
of promise of marriage, and yet was sufficient to enable him
to escape punishment. But the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that the statute provides a certain penalty for a
certain crime, and that that penalty can be avoided only in
the precise manner pointed out by the statute.
SLANDER.

In Hacker v. Heiney, 87 N. W. 248, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin holds that a recovery for mental suffering
alone may be had for malicious slander. "The
Damages.
nental
rule," says the court, "for which appellant conSuffering

tends (i. e., that in the absence of other actual

damage, no recovery could be had), has been applied only to
cases of negligence or of personal injury, where the mental
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suffering can result only from the injury and not from the
tort. ......
.It has never been applied to cases of malice, such as false -imprisonment and slander." See Ford v.
Schliessman, 107 Wis., 479, 83 N. W. 761.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

In Kling v. Bordner, 6I N. E. 148, the Supreme Court of
Ohio holds that a verbal agreement to leave property to
Part
another by will or otherwise in consideration of
Performtanc
personal services to be rendered by the latter is
within the Statute of Frauds and void, and the rendering of
services is not such part performance as will take the agreement out of the operation of the Statute. This decision is,
of course, in line with the English authority, Maddison v.
Alderson, 8 App. Cas., 467, but can hardly be said to be in
line with some of the cases in this country, especially in the
Western States, where the test has usually been treated as
being whether the plaintiff has by the promise of the defendant placed himself in a position, from which he cannot
dislodge himself as fully as though he had never been induced
to make the move. See Slingerlandv. Slingerland,39 Minn.
197. Further, the court says, the doctrine of part performance obtains in equity only, and does not avail to render a
contract which is void by the statute because unwritten or
unsigned capable of being sued on in a court of law. One
judge dissents, but unfortunately writes no opinion.
TSLEPHONFS.

The United States Circuit Court (Western District of
Kentucky) holds in Cumberland Telephone Co. v. LouisRights under vile Telephone Co., i1O Fed. 593, that where
conflicting
a city has granted to each of two telephone comGrants
panies the right to construct its, line on the same
side of the same street, neither grant being exclusive, in the
-absence of any statute or ordinance regulating the construction and operation of such lines, the company which
is prior in grant and in occupancy has the superior.right,
and the second company is not entitled to plant its poles
within the space previously occupied by the first company,
so that they will extend up through its wires, or to occupy
with its own wires the space beneath them, where it will
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impair the safety or interfere with the efficient operation of
the first line. Cf. ParisElectric Light & Ry. Co. v. Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co., 27 S. W. 902. "There
are many instances where numerous persons have equal
rights in a given locality, and yet where the law, good manners, and common sense equally require that the old maxim,
'First come, first served,' shall be observed."

TENANTS IN COMMON.

The question as to the effect of a sale by a co-tenant of
an interest in the property held in common is raised in the
case of Burt & Brabb Lumber Co. v. City LumSale by
Cotenat,

ber Co., 64 S. W. 652, where the Court of Ap-

Effet
peals .of Kentucky holds that a co-tenant cannot, without authority, sell the right to cut logs from the
land owned in common so as to pass the legal title to the
purchaser, and that the interest'which the purchaser acquires
can be asserted only in equity. Cf. the case of Barnes v.
Lynch, 151 Mass. 510, 24 N. E. 783, where one tenant in
common assumed to convey to a stranger a part of the common property by metes and bounds; and also the case of
Benedict v. Torrent (Mich.), 47 N. W. i29.
TRIAL BY JURY.

The Supreme Court of Oregon deals in Shobert v. May,
66 Pac. 466, with the rather frequently raised contention
that the constitutional guaranty of the right of
Ne glnce
trial by jury prevents the court from taking a
case from the jury. The court holds that in a negligence
case the only situation that authorizes the court to withdraw a case from the jury is where the facts are uncontradicted, and where the law adjudges the acts shown by such
facts to be negligent. Durbin v. Navigation Co. 17 Or. 5,
is cited where the Court said: "It is true that negligence is
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to determine from
all the circumstances of -the case, and that the cases where
a nonsuit is allowed are exceptional, and confined to those,
as here, where the uncontradicted facts show the omission
of acts which the law adjudges negligent."
(The word
"omission" should probably be "commission").

